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Old trading docs

Old trading docs

Last week, MrMacroMarkets tweeted a link to an old documentary on FX trading called Billion Dollar Day. It was amazing, and sent me down a rabbit hole of old trading videos.


Bulls and Bears, 1998 – Follows a group of futures traders in the late 1990s including John “Rambo” Moulton, a sarong-clad American working out of Queensland.


Trader, 1987– Paul Tudor-Jones in the 1980s is peak Wall Street in the 1980s.


Billion Dollar Day, 1985– Follows currency traders in the financial centres of London, New York and Hong Kong. This one is brimming with charming anachronisms


Let’s Deal Direct, 1984– Not a documentary per se but more of an educational advert for Bear Stearns’ mortgage-trading desk, of all things. Features some, umm, questionable acting and dialogue: “Could you use the bonds?” … “Yes sir, I CAN use the bonds” etc.


Black Wednesday, 1997– The BBC looks back at 1992’s Black Wednesday. It’s not quite as swash-buckling as some of the other videos on this list, but it does have some good trading colour from the day the Bank of England intervened in the currency market.

Did someone say something about synthetics?

Did someone say something about synthetics?

Two words excite me like no others.

They are synthetic securitisation (or, for the truly old-school, they are three words: regulatory capital trades). These deals usually involve repackaging loans on a bank’s balance sheet, then slicing them up into different tranches, and selling the exposure to a non-bank entity like an insurer, hedge fund, or asset manager through the use of credit derivatives.

In many respects, they hark back to the early days of securitisation, when JPMorgan first put together its BISTRO trades, otherwise known as the first synthetic CDOs. Banks may be genuinely offloading risk here, and the deals were called reg-cap trades precisely because they offered capital relief that’s so far been genuinely sanctioned by regulators. On the other hand, they seem to speak to some of the worst of the current environment: a pervasive search-for-yield that may see investors put their money in silly things at silly prices (for this reason, you will sometimes hear reg-cap specialists – usually hedge funds – gripe about the non-expertise of new entrants and the need to price the deals perfectly), as well as nagging concern that in fortifying the banking system post the financial crisis, we’ve simply offloaded a bunch of balance sheet risks onto other entities in a classic case of regulatory arbitrage.

In any case, I bring it up because in less than a week we’ve seen two stories published on the market, now said to be booming, first in the Financial Times and then in the Wall Street Journal. Both detail the rise of the market, with issuance described as having jumped by anywhere from 5.6 percent in the first quarter to at least 33 percent so far this year.

Those looking for a graphical representation of the recent rise of synthetic CDOs, could do worse than this chart from Deutsche Bank. It shows European deals only, but the direction of the trajectory is pretty obvious. The WSJ story also references some interesting figures from consultancy Coalition, pointing out that structured credit revenues at the top 12 investment banks more than doubled year-on-year to $1.5 billion the first quarter of 2017, exceeding the growth rate in more conventional trading businesses in the same period.

Growth in the business is not exactly a surprise, though.

More than five years ago I wrote in the FT about some of the bigger banks working hard to get the business going as a way of securing some new fees at a time when many of their other revenue streams were sluggish. In retrospect, that story’s now looking pretty prescient.

Big banks seek regulatory capital trades

 

Big banks are aiming to help smaller lenders cut the amount of regulatory capital they need to hold against loans in an attempt to make money from deals similar to those first created in the early days of securitisation more than a decade ago.

The big banks want to create so-called regulatory capital trades for smaller lenders as they expect demand for these kind of securitisation structures will rise ahead of regulations designed to provide more stability in the financial system.

Such trades, also known as synthetic securitisations, involve repackaging loans on a bank’s balance sheet, then slicing them up into different tranches.

The bank typically then buys protection on the riskiest or mid-level tranche from an outside investor such as a hedge fund, insurance company or private equity firm.

Doing so allows a bank to reduce the amount of regulatory capital it has to hold against the loans – a tempting prospect as banking groups are forced to hold more capital ahead of new regulation such as the forthcoming Basel III rules.

Some of the biggest global and European banks, including Barclays and Standard Chartered, are known to have recently built and used the structures to reduce the amount of capital they need to hold against corporate or trade finance loans.

But some large banks are now hoping to sell their structuring expertise and help distribute the resulting trades to buyers, investors in the trades say.

“The holy grail for some of the investment banks is to try to get some of the second and third tier banks involved, to get structuring fees,” said one investor. The trades hark back to the early days of securitisation in the late 1990s, which helped fuel the financial crisis.

“It’s almost as if you’re seeing the start of the securitisation market coming back in a very modest way,” said Walter Gontarek, chief executive of Channel Advisors, which operates Channel Capital Plc, a vehicle with $10bn in portfolio credit transactions with banks and has started a new fund dedicated to these structures.

Investors such as Channel Advisors say the yields on the deals are attractive compared with other debt securities on offer, and they are able to gain exposure to a specific portion of a bank’s balance sheet rather than invest in the entire thing. The insurers, hedge funds or private equity firms are not bound by the same, relatively onerous capital regulations as the banks. That makes it easier for them to write protection on the underlying loans in a classic case of regulatory arbitrage.”

…MORE… 

Some more early coverage below, for those interested.

Synthetic tranches anyone? – FT Alphaville
Anti-Abacus, anti-BISTRO and anti-balance sheet synthetic securitisation – FT Alphaville
Big banks seek regulatory capital trades
– FT, April 2012
Banks share risk with investors – FT, September 2011
Balance sheet optimisation – BOOM! – FT Alphaville, 2010

Safe assets, revisited

Safe assets, revisited

The idea of a shortage of ‘safe’ assets is a favorite of mine, dating back from 2011 when I first wrote about a crunch in triple-A rated assets for FT Alphaville to more recent things such as this piece for Bloomberg, and sometimes even on this blog. So it was a pleasure to discover, courtesy of Simon Hinrichsen (a former Odd Lots guest whom you should definitely follow on Twitter), a new paper on exactly this topic from Ricardo Caballero, Emmanuel Farhi and Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas. Read it for rather glorious sentences such as this one: “What is relatively new, relative to post–World War II history, is that the global economy is going through a complex structural period where the standard valuation adjustment for safe assets— via interest rate changes—have run out their course.”

Here’s a summary I wrote as part of our morning ‘Five Things’ newsletter, which you can sign-up for here.

“Want a stylized prism through which to understand almost everything that’s happened in the global financial system over the past two decades? Then take a look at this paper on “The Safe Assets Shortage Conundrum.” In it, the authors argue that savers’ desire to put their money in a reliable instrument has created a need for ‘safe’ assets that the financial system has had various degrees of success in fulfilling. In the early 2000s, the private sector tried to fill that need by creating triple A-rated bonds out of subprime mortgages. We know what happened next. After that, safe financial assets became largely the purview of governments via the bonds they sell – first the eurozone (which then experienced its own ratings problems) and then the U.S. Supply has ultimately failed to keep up with demand, however, mostly because slower growth has meant ‘safe’ governments in the developed world have been unable to generate assets at a fast enough pace to satisfy savings from emerging markets. It’s a state of affairs that will probably stick around for a long time, and one that helps explain why bond yields continue to plumb new lows, seemingly without rhyme or reason. But seriously, go read the whole thing.”

A side note: I do wonder what might constitute safe in the current environment. Yes, government debt is the clear winner here but corporate debt issued by cash-heavy, investment grade, national champion corporates – think Apple – can’t be far behind…

The AAA bubble, deflated

The AAA bubble, deflated

Half a decade ago, I wrote a post with a rather eye-catching lede. “This, we think, could well be the most important chart in the world right now,” it said.

AAAratings
It went on to discuss the disappearance of triple-A rated securities in the aftermath of the U.S. housing bubble and trillions of dollars worth of downgraded mortgage-backed securities. The disappearance was short-lived, however. By 2009, highly-rated government debt had more than filled the hole left by increasingly scarce AAA-rated securitizations.

“The AAA bubble re-inflates and suddenly sovereign debt becomes the major force driving the world’s triple-A supply,” said the 2011 post, written when worries over the eurozone debt crisis were in full swing. “It’s one reason why the sovereign crisis is well and truly painful.”

Frances Coppola has a much more recent post that reminded me of this.

It features a chart from the rating agency Standard & Poor’s, which forecasts that triple-A rated sovereign debt will essentially become an endangered species by 2050 thanks to a rise in government borrowing.

sandp

Coppola makes a good point here. “It’s a great chart. But what it is really telling us is that S&P’s way of assessing the creditworthiness of sovereigns belongs to a bygone age. In the new world, junk is safe, debt is an asset and investors fear governments. So ratings will be meaningless in future, and ratings agencies, redundant,” she concludes.

That said, I do wonder about the need and ability of the financial industry to re-engineer ‘safe’ securities with top-tier credit ratings, given the degree to which such ratings are still (incredibly!) embedded in our financial system – from liquidity buffers to central bank asset purchase programmes. For this reason, I would dearly love to see an updated chart encompassing all fixed income.

Update: A few days after this post, Gary Gorton and Tyler Muir published a related BIS paper on collateral shortages. Check out the write-up here.

Shadow banking, a compendium

Shadow banking, a compendium

Sometimes, looking at your past work reveals not only the progression of a real-world trend but also a subtle shift in the narrative of the topic under discussion.

It used to be that the ‘shadow banking system’ encompassed a relatively select group of non-bank financial intermediaries – broker-dealers, the repo market, money market funds, SIVs, etc. That group grew enormously in the years before the financial crisis, but has since collapsed pretty significantly.

Nowadays the definition of shadow banks appears to have expanded to include a host of non-bank financiers like direct lenders, asset managers, hedge funds etc.

Here’s a selection of some shadow banking pieces that illustrates the trend.

 

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