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Did someone say something about synthetics?

Did someone say something about synthetics?

Two words excite me like no others.

They are synthetic securitisation (or, for the truly old-school, they are three words: regulatory capital trades). These deals usually involve repackaging loans on a bank’s balance sheet, then slicing them up into different tranches, and selling the exposure to a non-bank entity like an insurer, hedge fund, or asset manager through the use of credit derivatives.

In many respects, they hark back to the early days of securitisation, when JPMorgan first put together its BISTRO trades, otherwise known as the first synthetic CDOs. Banks may be genuinely offloading risk here, and the deals were called reg-cap trades precisely because they offered capital relief that’s so far been genuinely sanctioned by regulators. On the other hand, they seem to speak to some of the worst of the current environment: a pervasive search-for-yield that may see investors put their money in silly things at silly prices (for this reason, you will sometimes hear reg-cap specialists – usually hedge funds – gripe about the non-expertise of new entrants and the need to price the deals perfectly), as well as nagging concern that in fortifying the banking system post the financial crisis, we’ve simply offloaded a bunch of balance sheet risks onto other entities in a classic case of regulatory arbitrage.

In any case, I bring it up because in less than a week we’ve seen two stories published on the market, now said to be booming, first in the Financial Times and then in the Wall Street Journal. Both detail the rise of the market, with issuance described as having jumped by anywhere from 5.6 percent in the first quarter to at least 33 percent so far this year.

Those looking for a graphical representation of the recent rise of synthetic CDOs, could do worse than this chart from Deutsche Bank. It shows European deals only, but the direction of the trajectory is pretty obvious. The WSJ story also references some interesting figures from consultancy Coalition, pointing out that structured credit revenues at the top 12 investment banks more than doubled year-on-year to $1.5 billion the first quarter of 2017, exceeding the growth rate in more conventional trading businesses in the same period.

Growth in the business is not exactly a surprise, though.

More than five years ago I wrote in the FT about some of the bigger banks working hard to get the business going as a way of securing some new fees at a time when many of their other revenue streams were sluggish. In retrospect, that story’s now looking pretty prescient.

Big banks seek regulatory capital trades

 

Big banks are aiming to help smaller lenders cut the amount of regulatory capital they need to hold against loans in an attempt to make money from deals similar to those first created in the early days of securitisation more than a decade ago.

The big banks want to create so-called regulatory capital trades for smaller lenders as they expect demand for these kind of securitisation structures will rise ahead of regulations designed to provide more stability in the financial system.

Such trades, also known as synthetic securitisations, involve repackaging loans on a bank’s balance sheet, then slicing them up into different tranches.

The bank typically then buys protection on the riskiest or mid-level tranche from an outside investor such as a hedge fund, insurance company or private equity firm.

Doing so allows a bank to reduce the amount of regulatory capital it has to hold against the loans – a tempting prospect as banking groups are forced to hold more capital ahead of new regulation such as the forthcoming Basel III rules.

Some of the biggest global and European banks, including Barclays and Standard Chartered, are known to have recently built and used the structures to reduce the amount of capital they need to hold against corporate or trade finance loans.

But some large banks are now hoping to sell their structuring expertise and help distribute the resulting trades to buyers, investors in the trades say.

“The holy grail for some of the investment banks is to try to get some of the second and third tier banks involved, to get structuring fees,” said one investor. The trades hark back to the early days of securitisation in the late 1990s, which helped fuel the financial crisis.

“It’s almost as if you’re seeing the start of the securitisation market coming back in a very modest way,” said Walter Gontarek, chief executive of Channel Advisors, which operates Channel Capital Plc, a vehicle with $10bn in portfolio credit transactions with banks and has started a new fund dedicated to these structures.

Investors such as Channel Advisors say the yields on the deals are attractive compared with other debt securities on offer, and they are able to gain exposure to a specific portion of a bank’s balance sheet rather than invest in the entire thing. The insurers, hedge funds or private equity firms are not bound by the same, relatively onerous capital regulations as the banks. That makes it easier for them to write protection on the underlying loans in a classic case of regulatory arbitrage.”

…MORE… 

Some more early coverage below, for those interested.

Synthetic tranches anyone? – FT Alphaville
Anti-Abacus, anti-BISTRO and anti-balance sheet synthetic securitisation – FT Alphaville
Big banks seek regulatory capital trades
– FT, April 2012
Banks share risk with investors – FT, September 2011
Balance sheet optimisation – BOOM! – FT Alphaville, 2010

It SIVs! It SIVs!

It SIVs! It SIVs!

These are the kind of stories I love to write. The creators of the first structured investment vehicle (SIV), a type of shadow bank that eventually went on to wreak havoc during the financial crisis, are staging a comeback with a plain old vanilla bank.

I’m sad to say though, that First Global Trust Bank does not have the same mythological ring to it as Gordion Knot.

Per the Bloomberg story:

Nicholas Sossidis and Stephen Partridge-Hicks, the bankers who created the model for structured investment vehicles that later collapsed during the global financial crisis, are back.

Sossidis and Partridge-Hicks own First Global Trust Bank Plc, a London-based firm that was authorized to provide banking services a month ago after a three-year approval process, U.K. Companies House and Financial Conduct Authority records show. The new lender is funded by Gordian Knot Ltd., their firm that once managed billions of dollars through a SIV until that vehicle’s 2008 collapse, the documents show.

“FGTB is a simple, narrow wholesale bank,” the lender’s website says. “We will only accept deposits or investments from professional, wholesale investors. Our business model doesn’t cater for retail deposits or current accounts….”

Read the whole thing here.

The year in credit

The year in credit

Credit markets, I wrote a lot about them this year. One day some other asset class will grab my attention but for the time being it’s this. Sorry.

Here’s what I wrote about the market in 2015 – or at least, since starting the new gig over at Bloomberg in April. I may have missed a few here and there (and included some fixed income posts that I think are related to over-arching credit themes), but I think this is pretty much covers it.

Happy holidays, and may 2016 be filled with just the right amount of yield.

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Yieldcos and MLPs and Glencore, oh my!

Yieldcos and MLPs and Glencore, oh my!

Here’s a thing that I wrote back in 2011, while parsing an Oliver Wyman report contending that the next hypothetical banking crisis would stem from over investment in commodities: “… as soon as investors start to doubt what constitutes ‘real’ demand for commodities and what’s pure speculation, they’ll head for the exits en masse, which will lead to a collapse in commodity prices, abandoned development projects and bank losses.” Though major losses haven’t occurred at the banks yet (just the famously non-bank Jefferies), we have seen the effects of the collapsing commodities super cycle elsewhere. Yieldcos, MLPs and commodities traders like Glencore and Trafigura — once the darlings of the financial world — are facing increasingly tough questions about their business models and, consequently their access to capital markets.

So here’s my latest post on an ongoing theme, this time about SunEdison and its yieldco, TerraForm Power:

The website of SunEdison, the renewable energy company, is a virtual smorgasbord of sunshine and light. “Solar perfected,” reads one slogan splashed across the page. “Welcome to the dawn of a new era in solar energy,” reads another banner over a pink-hued sunset.

While SunEdison’s marketing materials are firmly in the clouds, its share price has sunk to earth. The company is one of a batch of energy firms that have spun off their completed projects to public equity investors through vehicles known as “yieldcos,” only to see the share prices of those vehicles subsequently tank.

Now SunEdison and one of its two yieldcos, TerraForm Power, face additional questions about the health of their collective funding arrangements. Those concerns are emblematic of a wider problem for energy and commodities companies that have relied on eager capital markets to help finance their staggering growth in recent years.

Lured by the higher yields on offer from funding such projects, investors have stepped up to finance a host of energy-related products in recent years, contributing to a glut in supply that has spurred a dramatic collapse in commodities prices. That’s helping to fuel additional market scrutiny of commodities’ players—from giants such as Glencore to U.S. shale explorers and solar panel operators.

The concern now is that funding structures built on that fragile dynamic are apt to collapse should investors come to believe that the financing of latent commodity demand has far outpaced actual growth.

Investors are asking tough questions about ‘yieldcos’

Bank deposits, again

Bank deposits, again

It’s time to start thinking about bank deposits again.

And it’s always time to think about the interplay between monetary policy and financial regulation.

A new research piece by Zoltan Pozsar attempts to estimate the amount of deposits that could flow out of U.S. banks thanks to an interest rate rise by the Federal Reserve and the mechanics of the central bank’s new overnight reverse repo (RRP) programme.  At the same time, new Basel banking rules have pushed banks to hold big buffers of high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) to cover potential outflows. As I put it in the piece: “Two grand experiments, one conducted in the technical backwaters of monetary policy and the other operating in the realm of new banking rules, are about to collide. It bears watching.”

Go ‘watch’ the full article over here.

bankdeposits

 

 

New column – Asset managers, repo and derivatives. Oh my!

New column – Asset managers, repo and derivatives. Oh my!

Chances are, when you think of the repo market you think of banks and broker-dealers and the craziness that went down in 2008. This column, based on an amazing research paper by Zoltan Pozsar, suggests that’s a mistake.

(Bonus: It calls out Pimco on window-dressing its balance sheet)

Here’s an excerpt:

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What’s in a name? How peer-to-peer became marketplace lending

What’s in a name? How peer-to-peer became marketplace lending

I’ve written repeatedly about how peer-to-peer lending – the cuddly industry that began with the aim of disintermediating big banks by directly connecting individual borrowers with lenders – has been co-opted by the very industry it once set out to disrupt. As the industry grew and became more entwined with existing financial infrastructure, P2P lenders made a conscious decision to move away from the outdated “peer-to-peer” name.

Ever wonder how that happened? Here’s the story.

The future of the US peer-to-peer lending industry was decided in a luxurious San Francisco hotel on a spring evening last year.

On the sidelines of an alternative-lending conference, the heads of some of the biggest companies in the “P2P” space met privately to discuss rebranding the sector.

Eyeing the success of Uber and Airbnb — tech groups that have created digital marketplaces for car rides and rooms — they agreed to drop the peer-to-peer name in favour of “marketplace lending”.

In investor materials released over the following months by Lending Club, the biggest US P2P lender, as it prepared for its $5bn initial public offering, the phrase “peer-to-peer” did not appear once.

Democratising finance: P2P lenders rebrand and evolve

Shadow banking, a compendium

Shadow banking, a compendium

Sometimes, looking at your past work reveals not only the progression of a real-world trend but also a subtle shift in the narrative of the topic under discussion.

It used to be that the ‘shadow banking system’ encompassed a relatively select group of non-bank financial intermediaries – broker-dealers, the repo market, money market funds, SIVs, etc. That group grew enormously in the years before the financial crisis, but has since collapsed pretty significantly.

Nowadays the definition of shadow banks appears to have expanded to include a host of non-bank financiers like direct lenders, asset managers, hedge funds etc.

Here’s a selection of some shadow banking pieces that illustrates the trend.

 

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