Browsed by
Category: Look away – a random thought is coming

A short lesson in duration, from some long Petrobras bonds

A short lesson in duration, from some long Petrobras bonds

Earlier this week, Petrobras, the scandal-ridden, junk-rated state-controlled Brazilian oil producer, sold $2.5 billion worth of 100-year bonds.

The idea of these century-long bonds sent some tongues wagging about so-called duration risk. This is one of the more esoteric topics in bondland, but can roughly be defined as the sensitivity of a bond’s price to changes in its yield. The greater a bond’s duration, the more sensitive its price is to changes in its yield. With investors putting their money in Petrobras bonds for 100 years, so the thinking goes, these bonds are heavily exposed to the movement of interest rates. But is this the case?

One way of measuring duration is to look at something called PV01 on your (handy!) Bloomberg terminal.

This tells you by how many cents would the bond price changes following a 1 basis point move in yield. For Petrobras’s new century bonds, it’s less than 10 cents.

How does that stack up against some other bonds? For comparison, Petrobras’s bonds due in 2044 have duration of roughly $1.16.

Now I don’t mean to say that the 100-year Petrobras bonds aren’t risky. Investors still have to consider interest rates. And they have to think about what the Brazilian economy and the Brazilian government and the global oil market and Petrobras, still in the midst of a massive corruption investigation, will look like over the course of a century.

But duration risk for these bonds is not as high as it might be given investors are being compensated with a relatively high coupon and yield. Where duration risk is a concern is with all those low-yielding government bonds where that might not be the case. As Mark Holman at TwentyFour Asset Management points out, the duration of those 100-year Petrobras bonds is roughly equivalent to the duration of the current 10-year German Bund which, at the time of writing, has a yield of just  0.66 percent and a coupon of 0.5 percent.

The lesson: maturity ≠ duration.

Also, duration risk can crop up in unexpected places.

HFT – dazed and confused

HFT – dazed and confused

Dazed and Confused’s famous “School’s out” scene starts with a warning from a rather candid teacher: “This summer when you’re being inundated by all the American bicentennial fourth of July brouhaha. Don’t forget what you’re celebrating and that’s the fact that a bunch of slave owning aristocratic white males didn’t want to pay their taxes.”

It came to mind as I was reading Scott Locklin’s review of the new Michael Lewis book. I’m a big Lewis fan (a highlight of my career was being CCed in on an email to Lewis, which perhaps says something non-flattering about my career), but amidst this week’s “brouhaha” over Flash Boys, I think Scott makes some very interesting points.

I know a few HFT type people. One of ‘em might be even be as rich as Michael Lewis.  So far, all the ones I have met are clever and decent people, and I figure whatever they’ve managed to earn by the sweat of their brows, they deserve it. I’m not real pleased with the idea of a small group of decently paid, politically helpless nerds being the fall guys for a bunch of crooked oligarchs who don’t want to pay for their liquidity.

Michael Lewis: Shilling for the buyside

Hard-boiled conspiracy theories

Hard-boiled conspiracy theories

Whenever I find myself dismissing a conspiracy theory out-of-hand, I try to remember that the President of the United States of America once tried to fight high domestic inflation by scaring the general public about the dangers of cholesterol in eggs.

From page 96 of Robert Samuelson’s The Great Inflation and its Aftermath:

Shoe prices went up, so [President Lyndon B Johnson] slapped export controls on hides to increase the supply of leather. Reports that color television sets would sell at high prices came across the wire. Johnson told me to ask RCA’s David Sarnoff [RCA was then a major TV manufacturer] to hold them down. Domestic lamb prices rose. LBJ directed [Defense Secretary Robert] McNamara to buy cheaper lamb from New Zealand for the troops in Vietnam. The President told CEA [Council of Economic Advisers] and me to move on household appliances, paper cartons, news­ print, men’s underwear, women’s hosiery, glass containers, cel- lulose, [and] air conditioners … When egg prices rose in the spring of 1966 and Agriculture Secretary Orville Freeman told him that not much could be done, Johnson had the Surgeon General issue alerts as to the hazards of cholesterol in eggs.

Read More Read More