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Category: Business at Bloomberg

The corner in corporate bond markets

The corner in corporate bond markets

The backlash to the bond market liquidity theme in full-swing. That’s fine and expected though I do think some people are taking it a bit far. The problem with the liquidity story is not the story itself but simplistic bandwagon reporting that does not advance the narrative at all. I’ve said before on Twitter, it’s not enough to simply say that dealer holdings of fixed income have fallen X percent over the past X years, or that bond market liquidity is “a concern.” Many people, myself included, were talking about that theme and writing that story years ago and we need move on from that.

With that in mind, here’s a fresh angle to a stale story. In my opinion, it strikes at the heart of the issue – which is that the liquidity story is simply the flipside of what has been an intense scramble for corporate bonds in recent years.

What no one ever says about corporate bond market liquidity

Everyone’s worried about bond market liquidity. That much we know. Whether it’s high-yield corporate bonds sold by junk-rated companies or the ultra-safe Treasuriessold by the U.S. government, investors’ ability to buy and sell these securities without “overly” affecting prices has moved to front and center of the proverbial market concerns.

The causes, we hear, are myriad. Regulation that has curbed banks’ ability to hold vast sums of bonds on their balance sheets is often blamed. We are also told that years of low interest rates have herded investors to the same positions, spurring billions of dollars worth of inflows into global bond funds. The worry is that should those inflows reverse, bond prices could hit an air pocket and face a rapid descent.

There’s a long list of potential solutions to the problem. A shift toward electronic trading was once supposed to save a corporate bond market in which many trades are still done over the phone (although so-called electronification has apparently impeded liquidity in the U.S. Treasury market). Exchange-traded funds that give investors the ability to instantly dart in and out of positions are promoted as a quick fix for a longer-term problem. BlackRock, the world’s biggest asset manager, is pushing standardized bond issuance and wants to delay trade reporting for corporate debt.

All these solutions miss the point, however. None focus on the real reason behind deteriorating liquidity, which is that vast swaths of the corporate bond market have simply been cornered …

Read the rest over here.

Big bond news buried in a little report

Big bond news buried in a little report

Buried in BlackRock’s recent report into bond market liquidity was a bombshell bit of news.

Here’s the story:

BlackRock Inc. is muscling into trading venues that had long been the exclusive territory of big banks as the world’s biggest asset manager seeks to make up for declining liquidity in the bond market.

BlackRock revealed last week that it’s now trading bonds directly with inter-dealer brokers, following years of warning that liquidity is waning. In September, BlackRock said the corporate bond market is “broken.”

Banks have long facilitated the business, but regulations passed after the 2008 crisis hobbled their ability to do so. By trading with inter-dealer brokers — an industry that includes ICAP Plc and Tullett Prebon Plc — BlackRock is circumventing a middleman.

Money managers are “looking to get liquidity anywhere they can get it, and the other side is the inter-dealer brokers — their business model has been totally turned upside down,” Kevin McPartland, head of research for market structure and technology at Greenwich Associates, said in a phone interview.
Tara McDonnell, a spokeswoman for New York-based BlackRock, declined to comment.

A large investor trading directly with inter-dealer brokers marks a sea change for Wall Street, where big bond trades traditionally are executed between asset managers and large banks like JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Goldman Sachs Group Inc. Trading venues run by ICAP and Tullett Prebon, meanwhile, have historically brokered trades between banks and stayed clear of interacting directly with buy-side investors such as BlackRock …

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What we didn’t learn about the events of Oct. 15

What we didn’t learn about the events of Oct. 15

This week, the US.government released its report on the events of October 15.

I was disappointed.

The 72-page report has lots of points of interest but doesn’t come up with any definitive reason for the sharp movements in the 10-year U.S. Treasury. More disappointing than that (for me) was the report’s treatment of the events leading up to the day and specifically its very brief mention of volatility selling.

Here’s what the report said:

In addition, market participants reported that some large asset managers had maintained positions structured to profit from a continuation of the low-volatility environment that characterized much of 2014, though data to validate such claims are limited. Some market participants have speculated that a change in the distribution of certain options-specific risk factors among certain firms could have been a contributing factor. In particular, anecdotal commentary suggested that some dealers had absorbed a portion of the sizable “short volatility” position believed to have been previously maintained by large asset managers. As volatility spiked on October 15, those positions would have prompted some dealers to dynamically hedge this exposure, exacerbating the downward move in yields.

Long-time readers of this blog may remember that this is something I’ve written about before, specifically in a piece for the Financial Times entitled: “Caught on the wrong side of the ‘vol’ trade.” Unlike the Oct. 15 report, that article names a specific player who was said to have suddenly stopped selling vol.

“Pimco was a massive seller of volatility and when Gross left they started taking that position back,” says one hedge fund trader. “The Street was still thinking that short was out there. People expected the road to be there and the road wasn’t there.”

Given the debate over whether large asset managers are or are not systemically-important, it’s shame the Oct. 15 report did not dive into this particular theme a bit more.

The most interesting thing in GSElevator’s new book

The most interesting thing in GSElevator’s new book

John Lefevre, the former banker behind the GSElevator Twitter account, has written a book and it has some pretty fascinating tidbits about the business of selling bonds. Readers of my work (the three of you out there) will know that this is a favourite topic of mine and Lefevre’s experience as a fairly senior syndicate guy means he has some some authority here. Even Matt Levine, who isn’t generally a GSElevator fan, thinks so.

Here’s what I found most interesting after reading a preview.

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Why does everyone want corporate bonds? One word: Alpha.

Why does everyone want corporate bonds? One word: Alpha.

Why the intense scrum for new-issue corporate bonds? It’s not just the yield on offer from buying the new debt. It’s the fact that that yield, for a brief but important moment in time, exceeds the benchmark.

Here’s a little Bloomberg post based on research from Citigroup credit strategist Jason Shoup.

He estimates that investors can add 20 basis points of alpha just by purchasing new-issue bonds.

… Alpha has been scarce in recent years. More than half a decade of ultra-low interest rates and extraordinary monetary stimulus from the world’s central banks means that many assets are moving in tandem, making it more difficult for investment managers to find alpha-generating opportunities. If assets were racing they’d be neck and neck, so to speak.

However, one place where alpha can be generated is in the corporate bond market where big companies sell their debt. The reason is simple. When companies sell a new bond there is typically a lag between the bond being issued and when it’s included in benchmark fixed income indexes …

The simple reason why everyone wants new corporate bonds